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Plain text, structured, written for security review — no marketing images. Each item is tagged shipped or roadmap so you always know which is which.

Last updated: 2026-07-09 · Security contact: [email protected] · Company stage: early (founding design partners onboarding)

Deployment models shipped

• Cloud + local daemon (default): a local connector (single binary; macOS arm64/x86_64, Linux, Windows) runs on the user's machine and pairs to the cloud control plane. Tool-layer enforcement happens locally; audit rows are sent to the cloud.
• Egress gateway: model API calls route through the gateway for policy, DLP and metering, then forward to the provider the customer configured.
• Hosting: the control plane runs on Fly.io (Sydney region). The landing site is served by Cloudflare Pages.

Data flow — what leaves your machine shipped

• The daemon sends audit events (tool name, decision, timestamps, actor/account label, DLP-redacted content previews) to the control plane. DLP redaction of secrets happens on-device, before transmission on hook-based captures.
• Model calls made through the egress gateway carry the prompt/response bodies through the gateway only for the calls you route through it; bodies are DLP-scrubbed per policy before forwarding to the model provider.
• We deliberately do not use TLS interception. Coverage comes from official vendor hooks, MCP proxying, and the gateway — no root CA on your machines, no new attack surface. Deeper techniques (OS-level hooks, TLS MITM, sandbox wrapping) exist in the product but ship off by default behind a double consent gate, only for customers who mandate them.

What our logs contain — and do not contain shipped

• Contain: event type, timestamps, org and account attribution, tool/skill/workflow names, policy decisions and reasons, cost/token counts, DLP-redacted previews, hash-chain fields.
• Do not contain: plaintext secrets caught by DLP (redacted before the model and before the chain); passwords or API keys in application logs (never-log-secrets engineering rule); page titles in usage analytics are DLP-scrubbed before recording.

Audit-log integrity shipped

• Append-only, SHA-256 hash-chained audit log with a database-level immutability trigger — sealed rows cannot be updated even by the application.
• Ed25519 chain-head anchoring: signed anchors are exported off-box, so deletion or substitution of history is detectable even after infrastructure loss.
• Evidence Packs are Ed25519-signed and verify with a standalone offline CLI — your auditor needs no Proofpane account and does not have to trust our backend.
• Daily integrity cron re-verifies the chain and records the check itself on the chain.

Encryption & key custody shipped

• Transport: TLS for all client↔cloud and gateway↔provider traffic.
• At rest: customer API keys, device tokens and email credentials are Fernet-encrypted with a dedicated encryption secret (independent from session-token secrets, so credential rotation never destroys stored secrets).
• Evidence-signing key: Ed25519 private key held server-side; the corresponding public key ships inside every Evidence Pack so verification is self-contained.
• Device pairing: short-lived pairing codes; device tokens stored hashed; revocation enforced on every authenticated call.

Tenant isolation shipped

• Every tenant-scoped table carries an organisation id; all queries filter on it, and isolation indexes are enforced by an automated guard.
• The audit chain embeds the organisation id in each row's hash, so cross-tenant tampering is detectable, and file storage is namespaced per organisation.
• Role-based access control: owner / admin / member, with destructive operations gated to admin and above. JWT authentication; SSO (WorkOS SAML/OIDC and Google OAuth) supported.

Retention & backups shipped

• Audit archival moves rows past a configurable retention boundary out of the hot path without breaking chain verifiability.
• Database snapshots are compressed and shipped to S3-compatible object storage with retention rotation; signed chain anchors are additionally exported off-box for disaster recovery of verifiability.

Subprocessors (current)

• Fly.io — application hosting (Sydney).
• Cloudflare — landing-page hosting and CDN.
• Cloudflare R2 (S3-compatible) — encrypted backups and anchor export.
• Model providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, DeepSeek, or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint) — only for calls the customer routes through the gateway, under the customer's own keys where configured.
• Resend / Mailgun — outbound email, if the customer enables email features.

Certifications & assurance roadmap

• SOC 2 Type II: not yet certified; program start is on the current company roadmap. We say this plainly rather than implying otherwise.
• Penetration test: no third-party pen test completed yet; planned alongside the first enterprise deployment. Security researchers are welcome at the contact above.
• Binary signing: macOS notarisation (Developer ID) and Windows Authenticode signing are pending certificate procurement; the build pipeline publishes SHA-256 checksums today, and the installer verifies them.

Incident response

• Report security issues to [email protected] — acknowledged within 48 hours.
• Structured application logging and error tracking are in place; customers affected by a confirmed incident are notified directly.

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